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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals' majority decision that Gillmor's Complaint is barred 
by res judicata is incorrect because of the "private" nature of the prior actions 
between the parties and the "public interest" nature of the claims in the instant 
case. This case should therefore be remanded to the District Court to allow the 
matter to proceed on the merits. Second, a finding of res judicata does not 
automatically lead to sanctions. Thus, and because Gillmor's argument on res 
judicata could not possibly have violated Rule 11(b)(2), UTAH R. CIV. P., as it was 
found meritorious by a Judge of the Court of Appeals, the sanctions awarded by 
the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals based on an incorrect 
standard of review should be vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Res judicata does not apply. 
Appellees claim in their Brief that Gillmor does not refute the Court of 
Appeals' decision that res judicata applied. That is, obviously, incorrect. In her 
initial Brief on this Writ Gillmor refuted the Court of Appeals' majority decision by 
relying on the dissenting opinion in that case. Just because Gillmor's counsel 
relied on a dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals instead of adding more words 
to the initial Brief does not alter the fact that Gillmor believes that Judge 
Thome's reading of the law was right while the majority opinion was incorrect. 
Judge Thome's differentiation between the "private" nature of the prior 
actions between the parties and the "public interest" nature of the claims in the 
1 
instant case was well reasoned, clearly written and, Gillmor believes, persuasive. 
Gillmor v. Family Link, 2010 UT App 2, at HU24-27 and fn. 7. There is no 
pressing need to add more verbiage to Judge Thome's clean argument. But, since 
Appellees' requested more words on the subject, the first suit, between Mrs. 
Gillmor's husband and Mr. Richards, resulted in a private easement agreement as 
a settlement. The second suit was brought by Mrs. Gillmor to enforce that private 
easement agreement. 
This suit is not based at all on the private easement. Instead, the 
Complaint in this matter contains two claims: one for condemnation and one for 
a declaration of "highway-by-use" pursuant to State statute. Both of these claims 
are based on different facts and law than were alleged in the previous two 
Complaints. Therefore, QED according to Judge Thorne, Gillmor's Complaint is 
not barred by res judicata. 
The dissent and the majority opinion at the Court of Appeals both utilize 
Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 224 P.3d 741, 746 and 749 (Utah 2009), 
in reaching their respective and differing conclusions. The majority well outlined 
the transactional approach and the history of the same: 
[T]he claim that is alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or be one that could and 
should have been raised in the first action.' . . . * * * 'A 
claim or cause of action is the aggregate of operative 
facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.' 
2 
'Claims or causes of action are the same as those 
brought or that could have been brought in the first 
action if they arise from the same operative facts, or in 
other words from the same transaction.'... 'What factual 
grouping constitutes a 'transaction/ ... [is] to be 
determined pragmatically, giving weight to such 
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, 
space, origin, or motivations [and] whether they form a 
convenient trial unit. ...' Accordingly, 'res judicata ... 
turn[s] the essential similarity of the underlying events 
giving rise to the various legal claims/ or a common 
motivation behind those claims, '[r]ather than resting 
on the specific legal theory invoked.' 'Defining the scope 
of a claim or cause of action is not an exact science and, 
in fact, is at times driven by the relative importance of 
the finality of the judgment. When as in this case,... real 
property is at issue, the need for finality is at its apex.' 
Gillmor at Iffi 11-12 (internal citations omitted). 
The dissent utilized the pragmatic approach discussed in Mack to 
determine that the transactional approach did not bar Gillmor's complaint: "The 
objective of claim preclusion is 'that a controversy should be adjudicated only 
once.' This, however, is not feasible in the present case where members of the 
3 
public may still pursue a public claim regardless of prior private right litigation/' 
Gillmor at H 25 (internal citation omitted). Because "the precise facts and issues" 
were not determined in the prior suits res judicata should not bar this complaint. 
Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.SA., 2010 WL 3767800, 9 (111. 
App. 5 Dist). 
Appellees cite Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. V. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416 (Me. 1995), 
in support of their claim that res judicata applies here. (Appellees' Brief, p. 7.) 
Although the Irving Court found that a previous action would bar a claim of 
adverse possession, starting prior to the date of the previous action, the Court did 
not find that the previous action acted as a complete bar to all new actions 
regarding access between the parties. Id. at 418, ("As a matter of law, however, 
the 1951 judgment precludes the Kellys from having or claiming any right or title 
adverse to Irving for any period prior to November IQ51." (Emphasis added.)) 
Similarly, Gillmor's claims here, which are based on different facts and different 
laws should not be barred based on any previous actions. 
Appellees' also cite Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 633, 555 N.E.2d 229 
(Mass. 1990) to support their argument that this suit is barred by res judicata. 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 7.) However, again, the Bagley case is distinguishable for at 
least two reasons. First, in Bagley the plaintiffs brought three actions within six 
months of one another, where here the actions are separated by approximately 25 
years. Id. at 633-634. (Bagley I was filed on April 27,1987, Bagley II was filed 
on August 13,1987 and Bagley IIIwas filed on October 2,1987.) Second, 
4 
although the claims in Bagley II and Bagley III were somewhat different, the 
complaints contained some of the same facts. Id. at 637-638. On the contrary, 
the complaints in each of the Gillmor actions contain both different facts and 
different claims, and that is why the "transactional approach" adopted by this 
Court in Mack should not bar Gillmor's complaint. 
II. Res judicata does not apply because there was a change in the law. 
Additionally, res judicata does not bar this Complaint because of the 
change in law regarding a "highway by use" claim from the time the Court of 
Appeals interpreted the easement agreement in 2005 to now. Accordingly, this 
Court should remand the matter to the District Court to decide the claims 
between these parties, on the merits. 
The Court of Appeals decision against Gillmor in 2005 resulted in an 
altered situation for Gillmor because it minimized access to her land. In fact the 
decision minimized her access to the point that she will be unable to 
meaningfully leave her land to her children because they, specifically, been found 
to have no vehicular access to the land.1 
1 "However, given our conclusion, the grant of access is narrow as to those it 
benefits. Thus, Nadine's own children, as Frank's step-children, do not receive 
the benefit of this specifically authorized use of the easements as they are not 
related to Frank by any degree of consanguinity. As a result, we also conclude 
that the trial court erred in determining that this grant extended to Nadine's 
"spouse, if any in the future, along with her children, their spouses and children." 
Any future spouse of Nadine is plainly not anticipated or included in the language 
of the provision and, likewise, Nadine's children do not qualify as Frank Gillmor's 
immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity, nor are they Frank's 
children. Moreover, while the purposes for which Nadine personally and 
5 
Appellees claim that "highway-by-use" law has merely been clarified and 
not changed so res judicata is applicable. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 13-15.) 
Additionally, Appellees make the argument that this issue was not preserved with 
the District Court. (Appellees' Brief, p. 13) Of course this argument was 
preserved with the District Court. (See for example, R. 229, pp. 23, 26, 29 and 
61.) However, preservation of this issue is irrelevant since the District Court 
decided this matter on a motion to dismiss and determined res judicata applied 
before reaching the merits of Gillmor's claims. See R. 109. 
Specifically, Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 16 P.3d 1251 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2000) supports Gillmor's position that "highway-by-use" law has 
changed and therefore the Complaint in this case is not subject to a res judicata 
bar. For the change in the law, see Utah County u. Butler, 2008 UT 122; Town of 
Leeds v. Prisbey, 2008 UT 113; Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT icH. In 
individually intends to access the Gillmor property using the easements are not 
limited to those purposes set forth in the Agreement-i.e., animal husbandry, 
property maintenance, hunting, etc.-her personal right of access does not expand 
the rights of any other person to use the easements or the purposes for which the 
easements may be used, beyond what is stated in the Agreement." Gillmor v. 
Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 67, H23 (Utah Ct.App. 2005). 
2 "In this and two companion cases that we also decide today, we consider the 
operation and application of Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) (the "Dedication 
Statute." Butler at Hi. 
3 "In Wasatch County v. Okelberry, a companion case that we decide today, we 
set forth a bright-line rule for determining what qualifies as an interruption in 
continuous use sufficient to restart the running of the Dedication Statute's ten-
year period ..." Town of Leeds at If 6. 
4 "We hold today that an overt act that is intended by the property owner to 
interrupt the use as a public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so, 
6 
Collins the Court held that the law had changed based on an interpretation of an 
ordinance. Id. at 1254. Gillmor argues the same here where the Supreme Court 
of Utah interpreted and applied the Dedication Statute in Wasatch County v. 
Okelberry, and Town of Leeds v. Prisby, and Utah County v. Butler. Such a self-
asserted comprehensive interpretation and explication from the Supreme Court 
constitutes a change in the law that makes res judicata inapplicable. 
The Collins Court cites both State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 
U.S. 154 (1945) and Statler v. Catalano, 293 Ill.App.3d 483, 229 Ill.Dec. 274,691 
N.E.2d 384 (1997) in support of its decision. Further discussion from the Statler 
Court is instructive on why res judicata is inapplicable to Gillmor's claims: 
The doctrine of res judicata is of judicial origin and has 
been characterized as a rule of convenience designed to 
prevent repetitious law suits over matters which have 
once been decided and which have remained 
substantially static, factually and legally, but which must 
give way where there has been a change in the 
fundamental controlling legal principles. Similarly, the 
rule prevails in Illinois that res judicata extends only to 
the facts and conditions as they were at the time a 
judgment was rendered, and to the legal rights and 
is an interruption in continuous use sufficient to restart the running of the ten-
year period under this statute." Wasatch County at If 20. 
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relations of the parties as fixed by the facts so 
determined; and when new facts or conditions intervene 
before the second action, establishing a new basis for 
the claims and defenses of the parties respectfully, the 
issues are no longer the same, and hence the former 
judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar in the subsequent 
action. Even though the basic facts have not changed, it 
is generally accepted that res judicata does not operate 
as an automatic bar where between the time of the first 
judgment and the second there has been an intervening 
decision or a change in the law creating an altered 
situation. 
Statler at 276-277 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In this case both the facts and the law relating to these claims have 
changed - the situation has not remained static - so res judicata does not bar the 
two claims in her Complaint that is at issue here and this Court should thus 
remand the matter to the District Court to decide those claims on the merits. 
III. Sanctions should not have been awarded because Rule 11(b)(2), UTAH R. 
CIV. P., was not violated. 
Rule 11 requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the validity 
of the action prior to filing a complaint: 
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[B]y presenting a pleading ... an attorney ... is certifying 
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, * * * (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and 
other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law. 
Rule 11(b)(2), UTAH R. CIV. P. (emphasis added). 
Simply, Rule 11(b)(2) was not violated. Gillmor's claims have not been brought in 
any other suit, are nonfrivolous and either will establish new law (private 
condemnation) or are warranted by exiting law ("highway-by-use"). 
Gillmor's counsel, after conducting research, determined there were 
reasonable basis to bring the claims. "Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do 
perfect or exhaustive research. The appropriate standard is whether the research 
was objectively reasonable under all of the circumstances." Barnard v. Sutliff, 
846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). There is no finding, by either 
the District Court, or the Court of Appeals, that Gillmor's counsel did not do 
"objectively reasonable" research before bringing the Complaint, and this would 
seem to be the objective inquiry that Utah law requires. In fact, the District Court 
appears to have found that Gillmor's counsel did do research: "Neither can I find 
sufficient evidence in the record to show the absence of an honest belief that the 
9 
action might be justified, or that the action was filed to take unconscionable 
advantage of defendants." R. at 200. 
Instead of looking at the issue of "objectively reasonable" research, the 
District Court believed that because it found that res judicata applied that Rule 11 
sanctions must follow ipso facto. The Court of Appeals agreed and cited this 
standard for review of sanctions: "In view of our conclusion that Mrs. Gillmor's 
claims are barred by res judicata, the appropriate standard of review is whether the 
district court's decision to impose sanctions was an abuse of discretion. See 
Archuleta, 2008 UT 76,1f 7." 
However, the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard. The correct 
standard is: "[T]he standard of review for evaluating ... rule 11 sanctions involves 
a three-tiered approach: '1) findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard; 2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of 
error standard; and 3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.'" Morse v. Packer i5P.3d 1021,1025 
(Utah 2000) (citing Barnard u. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1234 (Utah 1992). 
Because the District Court appears to have found that Gillmor's counsel did 
research, and the Court of Appeals did not review any of the District Court's 
findings, the Court of Appeals did not do even step one of the three steps that must 
be taken to review an award of Rule 11 sanctions. The Court of Appeals exacerbated 
this error when it merely reiterated that the District Court was correct in 
determining that because res judicata applied that the sanctions were correct, and 
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skipped right to the third step, while omitting the previous two steps. Because the 
Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's decision based on an abuse of 
discretion standard, instead of reviewing the findings of fact and then interpreting 
the law on sanctions before reaching the abuse of discretion issue, the majority 
decision was based on the incorrect standard. 
Even if this Court finds that res judicata is applicable and that Gillmor's 
Complaint is subject to dismissal, Rule 11 sanctions do not ineluctably follow: "[W]e 
cannot say that [counsel's] reading of the law, alone, supports the conclusion that he 
did not make a reasonable inquiry into the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions contained in the complaint." Hess v. Johnston, 163 P.3d 747,751 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2007). Rule 11 sanctions should only be upheld when all three steps, are 
found to have been met on review, and sanctions are not warranted here, unless 
Gillmor's lawyer failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the claims asserted in the 
Complaint. As the first lawsuit resulted in an easement agreement and the second 
concerned contract interpretation (which is what a dispute over the settlement 
agreement is) and did not concern public rights, as were asserted in this Complaint, 
it is error to find that filing the Complaint is unreasonable. 
In fact a judge from the Court of Appeals agreed with Gillmor's counsel on the 
resjudictata component - presumably after he and his clerks conducted "objectively 
reasonable" research. Therefore, how can the Rule 11 standard, which is based on 
that same "objective reasonableness," be found to have been breached? See Kamen 
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 791 F.2d 1006,1012 (2nd Cir. 1986) ("'after 
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reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could *** form a reasonable belief that 
the pleading is well grounded in fact and law, Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254" (emphasis 
in original).) 
Appellees claim that numerous courts throughout the country have held a 
finding of "res judicata is sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions." (Appellees' Brief, 
p. 19.) Of course, the cases cited by Appellees are distinguishable and are 
distinguished, in the same order cited by Appellees', in their Brief: First, Schoney v. 
MemI Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59,62 (Utah CtApp. 1993) concerned the exact 
complaint that had been brought previously, while here there is a new complaint 
and new claims. ("Based on the trial court's review of the prior proceedings, it 
concluded the attempt to go forward with the class action, in light of the complete 
resolution of the matter eleven months prior, was 'unconscionable and beyond 
reason.'" (emphasis added.)) Second, in Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 784 
F.2d 777,780 (7th Cir. 1986) concerned a complaint based on the same facts, which 
is not the case with Gillmor's complaint. ("Although Mrs. Cannon's theory of relief 
has changed slightly, her complaint is based on the same facts as her previous suits. 
... Each suit sought the remedy the same single alleged wrong." (emphasis added).) 
Third, in King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1991) the 
complaint likewise contained similar facts and issues, unlike Gillmor's complaint. 
("King's counsel should have realized that King II was barred by King I because of 
the identity of facts and issues." (emphasis added).) Fourth, in Paganucci v. City of 
New York, 785 F.Supp. 467,475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), again, the complaint stated the 
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same claim, while Gillmor's claims have never been brought previously. ("The 
complaint in Marino states the same claim as the complaint in the instant case. 
Indeed, large portions of the two complaints are virtually identical/' (emphasis 
added).) Fifth, in Nothwang v. Payless Drug Stores NW, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 675, 676 
(D. Or. 1991) the plaintiffs counsel admitted that the complaint was deficient, and 
no such claim has been made by Gillmor's counsel, who still believes in the merits of 
the claims in the Complaint. ("Moreover, counsel for Nothwang acknowledged the 
deficiency of the complaint through a letter to the court. Having found that counsel 
for Nothwang signed a frivolous complaint, Rule 11 sanctions must be imposed." 
(emphasis added).) Sixth, in Estate of Blue v. County of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 
983 (9th Cir. 1997) three complaints were brought using the same claims and the 
same parties, which again, is not the case here. ("This is the third lawsuit involving 
the same civil rights claims and these parties" (emphasis added).) 
On the other hand, courts have also found that res judicata alone does not 
warrant sanctions. See Belmont Partners, LLC v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., 2010 WL 
3860381, 9-10 (W.D.Va 2010); Richter v. Russo, 647 F.Supp. 565,570 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986); Young v. Suffolk County, 705 F.Supp.2d 183, 214-215 (E.D.N.Y. 2010): 
'Rule 11 is violated only when it is patently clear that a 
claim has absolutely no chance of success.' Quoting 
Oliveri v. Thompson, 801 F.2d 1265,1275 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
Additionally, 'when divining the point at which an 
argument turns from merely losing to losing and 
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sanctionable, ... courts [must] resolve all doubts in favor 
of the signer' of the pleadings. Quoting Rodick v. City of 
Schenectady, l F.3d 1341,1350 (2nd Cir. 1993). * * * [T]he 
fact that certain claims did not survive a motion to 
dismiss does not warrant the imposition of sanctions in 
this case.... See generally Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 
(1978) (warning against the use of 'hindsight logic' that 
'because plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action 
must have been unreasonable or without foundation.'). 
No Utah Court has held that pursuing an action that is later found to be 
barred by res judicata requires the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Because 
Gillmor's counsel did the research that meets the reasonable and objective standard 
of Rule 11(b)(2), the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's award based on 
the incorrect standard of review, and this Court should vacate the sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 11(b)(2) was not violated and sanctions should not have been 
awarded. Additionally, Gillmor's action is not barred by res judicata. The Court 
should return the case to the District Court for further proceedings on the 
substance of Gillmor's Complaint. 
14 
DATED this fD ^ day of November, 2010. 
ruce R. Baird 
Dallis A. Nordstrom 
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